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Abstract
This position paper presents the following thought ex-
periment: can we build communication protocols that
(1) are sufﬁciently useful that they achieve widespread
adoption as general-purpose communication mechanisms
and (2) thwart censorship as a consequence of their de-
sign? We posit that a useful communication platform that
is inherently resistant to trafﬁc analysis, if widely adopted
and used primarily for purposes not related to censorship
circumvention, may be too politically and economically
costly for a government to block.
1 Introduction
The privacy enhancing technologies community has pro-
posed a number of systems for circumventing government
censorship, some of which (notably, Tor [3]) are in ac-
tive use today. Many existing approaches construct covert
communication channels that are hidden from the cen-
sor’s view. For instance, Infranet [4] constructs a covert
channel using sequences of seemingly “benign” HTTP
requests, Collage [2] embeds messages in images up-
loaded to sites that host user-generated content, and de-
coy routing techniques such as Telex [17] hide requested
URLs in SSL/TLS handshakes. More recently, a number
of trafﬁc shaping approaches have been proposed (e.g.,
SkypeMorph [8] and Freewave [6]) that attempt to con-
ceal covert channels by either tunneling them within per-
mitted protocols or changing their trafﬁc patterns to cause
them to appear as benign streams.
While the above techniques certainly make censorship
more difﬁcult, their security properties are not currently
well-understood. In particular, a knowledgeable and pow-
erful censor could potentially defeat such measures by ap-
plying steganographic detection techniques [9], enumer-
ating the location of decoy routers [10], and/or leveraging
machine learning-based trafﬁc analyzers to perform trafﬁc
classiﬁcation (cf. [14–16]).
Fully understanding the security of existing censorship
resistant techniques is an open question that we do not ad-
dress in this paper. In this position paper, we posit that
the security analyses of censorship circumvention sys-
tems will likely follow the typical security “arms race”
in which discovered vulnerabilities are followed by pro-
posed ﬁxes. Arguably, given the asymmetry between the
adversary(e.g., anationstatewithcentralizedcontrolover
the nation’s communication architecture) and the user of
the anti-censorship system (e.g., a dissident who is depen-
dent on the monitored network infrastructure), the advan-
tage in this arms race likely lies with the censor.
This paper takes the position that rather than existing
as a standalone system, censorship-resistance should be
a characteristic of a widely ﬁelded and general-purpose
communication platform. That is, we assert that it is more
difﬁcult for a censor to block a ubiquitous and widely-
used communication protocol than a niche application de-
signed solely to circumvent censorship. Our goal is to
avoid the censor vs. anti-censorship arms race by instru-
menting a reliable and high-performance communication
primitive that we hope will be widely deployed, not used
primarily as an anti-censorship apparatus, but that is in-
herently difﬁcult to surveil and block as a natural conse-
quence of its design.
Paradoxically, to be effective as an anti-censorship
technology, such an architecture should achieve
widespread adoption for purposes unrelated to cen-
sorship circumvention. If the primary purpose of the
architecture is censorship circumvention, the cost to the
adversary of barring access to protocols built using the
architecture is low. However, if the architecture is also
regularly used for business and commerce, blocking an
otherwise useful tool that has widespread adoption may
be too politically and economically costly for a censor.
To this end, the architecture must both encourage general
purpose usage and be competitive with existing methods
of communication.
12 Censorship-Resistant Communi-
cation Architectures
We consider two parties, Alice and Bob, who want to
communicate with each other over the Internet. Eve, the
censor, observes and controls all packets going to or com-
ing from Alice. Alice is motivated to prevent Eve from
discovering that she is attempting to communicate with
Bob. We assume that Bob is outside of the censor’s view.
To facilitate its general use as a communication plat-
form and not just as a censorship countermeasure, our
architecture should provide beneﬁts over direct IP com-
munication. Below, we brieﬂy outline general-purpose
centralized (Section 2.1) and decentralized (Section 2.2)
architectures that enable efﬁcient and reliable communi-
cation and are also resistant to censorship.
2.1 Centralized Architecture
We observe that, in principle, anti-censorship can be
straightforwardly achieved by using a trusted third party
to bridge a connection between Alice and Bob, so long
as the censor does not block access to the third party. The
third party server, which we call the broker, maintains full
control of the communication network and manages key
distribution and status information. We assume that users
know the public key of the broker and can hence commu-
nicate privately with it. Users upload their public keys to
the broker and are required to register with the broker be-
fore they can participate in the network. The broker serves
as a relay for all communication between clients.
To achieve end-to-end communications privacy, Al-
ice and Bob can query the broker for the other party’s
public key (certiﬁcate) and communicate privately over
SSL/TLS, using the broker as an intermediary (i.e., a
router). Importantly, messages should be protected us-
ing SSL/TLS with the broker so that the censor cannot
discover with whom Alice is communicating.
We emphasize that such a rendezvous mechanism also
enhances reliability since it enables two parties to com-
municate even when direct IP communication is not avail-
able (e.g., when the receiver is behind a ﬁrewall or NAT
and cannot accept incoming connections). A broker
with sufﬁcient resources to provide high bandwidth, low-
latency communication between nodes could encourage
widespread utilization of the service. Importantly, since
Bob’s identity is encrypted and (by assumption) Bob is
located outside of the censor’s view, then the censor can-
not distinguish between streams that should be subject to
censorship and those that should not. That is, it is left with
the choice of either blocking access to the broker — and
hence “censoring” everything — or permitting all trafﬁc.
If sufﬁciently widely adopted for business and commerce,
wepositthattheﬁnancialcost ofblockingtheservicemay
outweigh the adversary’s desire to censor.
We note that such a centralized architecture is feasible
even at large scale, as is illustrated by Google’s Voice and
Hangout services. However, a centralized design comes
with the obvious weakness of having a single global point
of failure: should the centralized service be compromised
by the censor, attacks such as monitoring, eavesdropping,
and censorship become much easier to perform. As indi-
cated by the Snowden documents, governments can (and
do) leverage the centralization of existing communication
systems (e.g., Skype, Facebook, Google, etc.) to focus
their surveillance efforts, with or without the cooperation
of the operators of the centralized systems [5].
2.2 Distributed Architecture
We brieﬂy sketch a distributed communication protocol
that is performant, has several potentially useful advan-
tages over direct IP communication, and is naturally resis-
tant to monitoring and censorship. Since a major goal of
censorship-resistance by side-effect is to gain widespread
adoption of our protocol, we aim to support a variety of
network applications (e.g., voice-over-IP, ﬁle transfer, in-
teractive messaging, etc.).
Our protocol makes use of a fully decentralized
directory service that supports put(key;value) and
value   get(key) semantics. A standard DHT (e.g.,
Chord [12]) that supports low-cost lookups is a reason-
able implementation. When nodes (potential communi-
cants) come online, they register by putting their public
key as well as a contact point into the decentralized direc-
tory, keyed by a unique identiﬁer (UID) such as a hash1
over their email address. To anchor trust in the system,
public keys could be signed by peers, creating a social
web of trust similar to that used by PGP/GnuPG. Addi-
tionally, decentralized certiﬁcate veriﬁcation techniques
(e.g., Google’s Certiﬁcate Transparency [7]) that rely on
append-only data structures may provide useful protec-
tions.
If a node can receive network communication—e.g., it
is not behind a ﬁrewall, proxy, or NAT—then it advertises
its network address as its contact point. Otherwise, the
node (i) chooses a peer as a rendezvous point (RP) and
sets its contact point to be the RP’s UID, and (ii) creates a
TLS connection to its RP.
1The use of the hash function provides some privacy protections,
since it makes it more difﬁcult to cull email addresses and network loca-
tions from the directory.
2When a node, Alice, wants to send a message to a node
Bob, it queries the directory to discover Bob’s contact
pointandpublickey. (WeassumeAlicehasaprioriknowl-
edge of Bob’s UID/email address.) If the contact point is
a network address, then Alice initiates direct communi-
cation; otherwise, Alice must iteratively query the direc-
tory until she learns of an appropriate rendezvous point
for Bob. Using the public keys retrieved from the direc-
tory, Alice initiates a TLS connection to Bob or Bob’s
rendezvous point (or the rendezvous point’s RP, etc.). In
the lattercase, Bob’s RP relays thecommunication (again,
using a TLS connection) to Bob.
Our envisioned protocol supports explicit redirection—
the metadata of a message may contain instructions to
forward that message to another party. Since messages
are encrypted in TLS, this permits a form of onion rout-
ing [13] similar to that used by Tor [3].
The above RP and redirection schemes provide useful
reachability properties: Alice can contact Bob, regardless
of their network locations. That is, Alice can initiate a
connection to Bob, even if Bob is behind a ﬁrewall or
NAT, eliminating the need to develop specialized NAT
piercing techniques. In addition to enabling anonymous
communication, explicit redirection also improves reach-
ability and reliability, since trafﬁc can be easily rerouted
around network failures. And importantly, by adopting
the above protocol, developers do not need to build their
own directory services, signiﬁcantly decreasing develop-
ment time.
To provide high-performance messaging, our protocol
can natively take advantage of previously proposed net-
work performance optimization techniques. For exam-
ples, the protocol could apply pre-fetching techniques
such as SPDY [11] to request multiple objects (e.g., el-
ements of a webpage) in an initial request, reducing the
number of roundtrips and signiﬁcantly shortening latency.
Our protocol could also borrow techniques from resilient
overlay networks [1] and exploit triangle inequalities in
the network underlay to decrease e2e latency and poten-
tially improve goodput.
We argue that the above design—while admittedly far
from complete—provides useful properties to application
designers, and has the potential to signiﬁcantly decrease
development time. Although the protocol is not robust
against blocking (in particular, an adversary can prevent
access to the directory service), its use of encrypted pay-
loads and potential redirection makes it difﬁcult for an
adversary to discern the endpoints and content of an in-
tercepted communication. The censor thus has to choose
between preventing all use of the protocol or allowing the
protocol’s use. If the protocol is sufﬁciently advantageous
to developers and is widely adopted by a variety of net-
work applications, then the adversary may be forced to
forgo censorship.
3 Conclusion
This paper proposes two general-purpose communication
protocols that inherently resist censorship. To motivate
adoption even when censorship resistance is not a goal,
our protocols are generally useful: they allow peers to
communicate when direct IP connections are unsupported
(e.g., due to a ﬁrewall, proxy, or NAT), and they pro-
vide message conﬁdentiality through end-to-end encryp-
tion. This paper argues that if such communication de-
signs are widely used, then censors must choose between
signiﬁcant “overblocking” (thus incurring high political
and potentially economic costs) and allowing unfettered
access to information.
Acknowledgments
This work is partially supported by NSF CAREER CNS-
1149832 and NSF grants CNS-1064986, CNS-1204347,
and CNS-1223825. The ﬁndings and opinions described
in this paper are those of the authors, and do not nec-
essarily reﬂect the views of the National Science Foun-
dation. Additionally, this material is based upon work
supported by the Defense Advanced Research Project
Agency (DARPA) and Space and Naval Warfare Systems
Center Paciﬁc under Contract No. N66001-11-C-4020.
Any opinions, ﬁndings and conclusions or recommenda-
tions expressed in this material are those of the author(s)
and do not necessarily reﬂect the views of the Defense
Advanced Research Project Agency and Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Center Paciﬁc.
References
[1] D. G. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, M. F. Kaashoek, and
R. Morris. The Case for Resilient Overlay Networks. In
Workshop on Hot Topics in Operating Systems (HotOS),
2001.
[2] S. Burnett, N. Feamster, and S. Vempala. Chipping Away
at Censorship Firewalls with User-Generated Content. In
USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2010.
[3] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The
Second-Generation Onion Router. In USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX), 2004.
[4] N. Feamster, M. Balazinska, G. Harfst, H. Balakrishnan,
and D. Karger. Infranet: Circumventing Web Censor-
3ship and Surveillance. In USENIX Security Symposium
(USENIX), 2002.
[5] B. Gellman and A. Soltani. NSA Inﬁltrates Links to Ya-
hoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Docu-
ments Say. The Washington Post, October 30 2013.
[6] A. Houmansadr, T. Riedl, N. Borisov, and A. Singer. I
Want My Voice to be Heard: IP over Voice-over-IP for
Unobservable Censorship Circumvention. In Network and
Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2013.
[7] B. Laurie, A. Langley, and E. Kasper. Certiﬁcate Trans-
parency. RFC 6962, Internet Engineering Task Force,
2013.
[8] H. M. Moghaddam, B. Li, M. Derakhshani, and I. Gold-
berg. SkypeMorph: Protocol Obfuscation for Tor Bridges.
In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS), 2012.
[9] N. Provos and P. Honeyman. Detecting Steganographic
Content on the Internet. Technical Report 01-11, Cen-
ter for Information Technology Integration, University of
Michigan, 2001.
[10] M. Schuchard, J. Geddes, C. Thompson, and N. Hopper.
Routing Around Decoys. In ACM Conference on Com-
puter and Communications Security (CCS), 2012.
[11] SPDY: An Experimental Protocol for a Faster
Web. http://www.chromium.org/spdy/
spdy-whitepaper.
[12] I. Stoica, R. Morris, D. Karger, M. F. Kaashoek, and
H. Balakrishnan. Chord: A Scalable Peer-to-Peer Lookup
Service for Internet Applications. In Conference on Ap-
plications, Technologies, Architectures, and Protocols for
Computer Communications (SIGCOMM), 2001.
[13] P. F. Syverson, D. M. Goldschlag, and M. G. Reed. Anony-
mous Connections and Onion Routing. In IEEE Sympo-
sium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 1997.
[14] A. M. White, K. Snow, A. Matthews, and F. Monrose.
Phonotactic Reconstruction of Encrypted VoIP Conversa-
tions: Hookt on fon-iks. In IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (Oakland), 2011.
[15] C. V. Wright, L. Ballard, S. E. Coull, F. Monrose, and
G. M. Masson. Spot Me if You Can: Uncovering Spo-
ken Phrases in Encrypted VoIP Conversations. In IEEE
Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland), 2008.
[16] C. V. Wright, L. Ballard, F. Monrose, and G. M. Masson.
Language Identiﬁcation of Encrypted VoIP Trafﬁc: Ale-
jandra y Roberto or Alice and Bob? In USENIX Security
Symposium (USENIX), 2007.
[17] E. Wustrow, S. Wolchok, I. Goldberg, and J. A. Halder-
man. Telex: Anticensorship in the Network Infrastructure.
In USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX), 2011.
4